

Understanding the Influence of the Pakistani Government in South Asia

**A Monograph
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Abstract

Understanding the Influence of the Pakistani Government in South Asia

by MAJ William D. Chesher, U.S. Army, 56 pages.

This monograph will explore the origins of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in South Asia that can be traced back to the Islamization program during the Zia ul Haq regime in Pakistan. Since 1947, Pakistan's early political administrations were characterized by a failure of governance, resulting in five failed regimes in twenty years. The political turmoil from Iskander Mirza's presidency in 1957 through the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime ending in 1977 prompted the military to assume the role of the guardian of the Muslim State. Equally as important to understanding Pakistan's political and military relationship is that each of these regimes changed the Constitution of Pakistan, ensuring that political power was placed under the presidency, and by doing so, limited the authority of the provincial leadership. From these formative years, the Pakistani people experienced a series of failed regimes that ended in coups and created the perception that Pakistan's government needed a military leader with complete control.

The Zia ul Haq regime lasted from 1977 to 1988, and through its Islamization program, changed the human landscape in Pakistan. Under his rule, Zia's Islamization program focused on bringing Islam into every aspect of Pakistani life. Through the implementation of the *zayat* (alms), and *usher* (taxes), Zia began to fund the madrassas throughout Pakistan. During the Soviet-Afghan War, Pakistan began to assist the Afghan Resistance Movement by supporting the *mujahedeen*. With funding from the United States and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan—through the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI)—supported the *mujahedeen* from the tribal areas along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a direct result of this support, the Islamization program created the conditions for militant Islam to flourish in the tribal areas by supporting the Islamic extremists with funding, religious desire, and the physical space to thrive within Pakistan.

After Zia ul Haq's regime ended and the Islamization program failed to achieve its purpose, Pakistan's government began to rebuild. The regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif ended abruptly because of the effects of corruption and poor governance, yet both returned to public office without addressing a failing economic situation. The United States' implementation of economic sanctions over Pakistan's nuclear program only worsened the economic situation. In addition to the ongoing conflict with India, and the Taliban take over of Afghanistan, Pakistan soon found itself between the United States and Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda. It was between the end of the Soviet-Afghan War and mid 1990's that the Islamic fundamentalists and their allies flourished inside Pakistan. Their goal was to implement a transnational *jihad* against the United States, and they would be responsible for conducting the attacks of September 11, 2001.

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Introduction

Understanding Pakistan's Government's Influence in South Asia

“When the puppy raised at home begins biting its own people, he must be put to sleep.” Major

General Ejaz Awan, Commanding officer in Swat, Pakistan. April 2009¹

Major General Awan's comment on the Pakistani military actions in the Swat Valley in 2009 can serve as a metaphor for Pakistan's desire to maintain its sovereignty as a Muslim state. It also suggests a context in which to view Pakistan's actions. Simply stated, the preservation of Pakistan as a sovereign Muslim state will remain the Pakistani government's number one priority. This belief is the foundation of Pakistan's identity and guides its actions and relationships globally, nationally and regionally. From deployments of military units along the Pakistan-India border to nuclear arms development, and even the repeated deposition of political administrations, all of Pakistan's actions center on the survival of the nation.

Understanding the context that defines Pakistan today is essential to any insights into the actions that are taking place in South Asia and the Middle East. Today, the problem for the United States is how to support the current Pakistani government in “disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al Qaeda within their borders, while preventing its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.”² As proven in the past, the solution may not be as straightforward as providing economic assistance Pakistan. To ensure these conditions are met, one must take into consideration Pakistan's history and the responsibility Pakistan has to its citizens and regional allies.

¹ Imtiaz Gul, *The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan's Lawless Frontier* (New York: Penguin, 2010), xviii.

² The White House, President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” December 01, 2009, Speeches & Remarks, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan> (viewed June 10, 2010)

Pakistan's creation was the result of the religious division between the Hindu and Muslim people in India. Early in the 20th century, Mohammad Ali Jinnah's League petitioned India for a separate Muslim State. On August 14th, 1947, Pakistan's government began in Karachi. This newly created state experienced the migration of Muslims and Hindus across the Indian subcontinent accompanied by an underlying pattern of violence that continues today.

Throughout Pakistan's history, the United States has played an integral part in its development into a regional power. Although this relationship was founded upon mutual assistance, it was Pakistan that initially reached out to the West. During the 1950s, the United States enjoyed utilizing Pakistan's strategic location within South Asia to support its containment policy against the spread of Socialism. In return, the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration provided over \$501 million dollars in security assistance and economic aid.³ Unfortunately for both countries, differences over regional issues and Pakistan's political decisions would test this relationship for the next 60 years.

Since partition the United States relies on Pakistan for regional support in South Asia. What one might characterize as Pakistan's ambivalence towards Western assistance can be attributed to Pakistan's allegiance to Islam, its citizens, and the security of the Muslim state. Because of this, over time the United States has imposed embargos and sanctions that created its reputation of being a fair weather friend of Pakistan. This narrative undermines the United States today in its efforts to counter the Islamic fundamentalist threat that resides within Pakistan.

Understanding the history of the Pakistani government is essential to realizing why Pakistan chooses its actions. Political scientist Masood Ashraf Raja addresses the Muslim identity of Pakistan in his book *Constructing Pakistan*. He quotes Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man

³ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press Center), 83. Following an interagency review of foreign military aid programs headed by the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Herbert Prochnow, Dennis Kux states, "The study revealed that fulfilling the October 1954 arms aid commitment to Pakistan would cost \$505 million—almost three times the original estimate of \$171 million. The report also found that Pakistan would need more than \$100 million a year in ongoing U.S. assistance just to maintain the force structure."

credited with the creation of Pakistan: “There could be no simple private public division of the Muslim idea of culture and selfhood, for Islam had always been considered a complete code of life that spanned public and private.”⁴ This observation is no more apparent than in Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan. Historian and scholar Lawrence Ziring highlights this fundamental inspiration in his book, *Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History*, when he states, “Pakistan had been created from the demand that Muslims were a separate nation and therefore entitled to an independent homeland.”⁵ This idea is essential in understanding the Pakistani identity and what shapes its national beliefs and motivations.

This monograph will establish how the events that took place from 1977 to 1988 shaped the human landscape within Pakistan into a regional and global terrorist threat that the United States and its allies face today. Throughout these years, Mohammad Zia ul Haq implemented his Islamization program. Whether directly or indirectly, Zia’s political decisions were responsible for creating the foundation for the militant Islamic groups whose focus it is to harm the United States and the West. This study will present an analysis of the historical approaches of Pakistan’s government towards militant extremism within Pakistan’s borders and will elaborate on the secondary effects of those decisions on the Muslim state. Studying this is essential in order to understand why Pakistan is the way it is today from the perspectives of historians, journalist’s,

⁴ Masood Ashraf Raja, *Constructing Pakistan: Foundational Texts and the Rise of Muslim National Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), xvi. Raja further elaborates his claim by stating, “Hence, while social, religious and ethno-linguistic ideologies became part of the mobilizing discourse of the Muslim elite, the main problem was not cultural—for they had always had a thriving and distinct culture—but political, a question of survival under a national structure dominated by British and native Hindus.

⁵ Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2005), 69. Ziring cites that, “Jinnah, virtually alone, became the exponent of constitution making along secular lines. His vision involved the blending of multiple traditions, in particular the Islamic experience with those at variance with it. Jinnah addressed the pressing need to build a civil society, but never developed a strategy for the merger of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians, let alone the integration of Bengalis with Punjabs, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Balochis, and the myriad of refugees flooding into the state from India...To argue after Partition, as Jinnah did, that Pakistanis were neither Muslim nor Hindu nor Sikh, but citizens of an all-embracing secular state, had little meaning for the vast majority who were now expected to adapt the Pakistani identity.”

and Pakistanis. By focusing on Pakistan from a national perspective, the methodology in this paper will consider significant events, both regionally and nationally, against the Islamic perspective that the Pakistani government has applied over the last 60 years. The approach will be to explore the historical context that produced the current dynamic, not only within Pakistan but also within the region itself. This will elucidate the cultural roots of what appears to be—from an outside perspective—as Pakistan’s ambivalence about addressing the terrorist threat within its boundaries.

The earliest events confronting the newly formed Pakistani government emerged from the migration of Muslims into Pakistan. According to historian Ian Talbot in his book *Pakistan: A Modern History*, “The September 1947 communal massacres in Jammu province created a flood of over 80,000 Muslim refugees to neighboring Sialkot in West Punjab.”⁶ In a radio address by Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan said, “The defense of the State is our foremost consideration...and has dominated all other governmental activities. We will not grudge any amount of the defense of our country.”⁷ The violence resulting from the resettlement of Muslims and Hindus during the Partition led to a disputed border and a series of military clashes between Pakistan and India. It is from this disputed region of Jammu-Kashmir that Pakistan fought four wars with India that later brought them to the brink of a nuclear exchange in the 1990’s.⁸

The All-India Muslim League’s creation in 1906 by Nawab Sir Khwaja Salimullah Bahadur moved the notion of a Muslim state on the Indian subcontinent towards becoming a reality. The League’s integral role during the independence from India created the largest Muslim

⁶ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 116.

⁷ Chaudri M. Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 376.

⁸ Christophe Jaffrelot, *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins* (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 15. Pakistan would fight four wars with India. The Indo-Pakistan Wars of 1947, 1965 and 1999 were fought over the Jammu Kashmir region, while the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 revolved around the crisis in East Pakistan, now called Bangladesh.

state in the world.⁹ The man who would eventually make this partition a reality was Mohammed Ali Jinnah. His vision was “one nation, one culture, one language” was the basis of this partition. Jinnah’s vision is captured in Pakistan’s Constitution of 1956. The preamble states that “[citizens] should organize their lives both as individuals and collectively in accord with the demands and the principles of Islam as laid down in the Koran and in the Sunna [the traditional law of the Prophet].”¹⁰ Throughout Pakistan’s history, its Constitution would reflect the reigning leader’s vision and direction but always reaffirm its commitment to a sovereign Muslim state. Over its 63 years of existence, Pakistan would rewrite their Constitution three times and amend it eighteen times. The following sections will explore the history and changes in Pakistan that would set the foundation for the Zia ul Haq regime to import its own interpretation of a Muslim state.

Establishing a Pakistan That All Muslims Can Live In

To understand Zia ul Haq’s politico-military regime and its effects on Pakistan, one must understand the significant and defining events and characteristics of Pakistan from its creation up to the 1970s. The economic, social and regional stability issues seen in Pakistan today find their origins during the partition from British India. This section will look at how Pakistan’s early years of regional instability and insufficient governance, from the Partition to the end of the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime, set the conditions for the implementation of Islamization, a program designed to unite Pakistan by synthesizing religion and governance, and which transformed Pakistan into an Islamic State.

⁹ Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2. According to the Census of India, 1941, (Command Paper No. 6479, Table VI, II.) 33 million Muslims lived in Bengal (approximately 55 percent of the population) and 16 million Muslims lived in Punjab (approximately 57 percent of the population).

¹⁰ Jaffrelot, 9. “January 1933 a Muslim student at Cambridge, Chaudir Rehmat, Ali, had taken up the idea and suggested that the state should be called ‘Pakistan’, literally for ‘the land of the pure’, the word being formed acronymically: ‘P’ for Punjab, ‘A’ for Afghans of the frontier (in fact the Pashtuns of the Northwest Frontier Province), ‘K’ for Kashmir, ‘S’ for Sind, and ‘tan’ for Baluchistan.”

The nation of Pakistan came about as the result of the Muslim League and its goal to create an independent Muslim state separate from British or Indian rule. The notion of creating a separate Muslim state for North Indian Muslims within India belongs to Allama Iqbal, but it was not until March 1940 when Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League passed a resolution calling for the formation of a separate country made up of the provinces in British India that held the Muslim majority.¹¹ By uniting the provinces that held a majority population of Muslims over Hindus, the Muslim League wanted to establish a union of independent sovereign states that would enjoy autonomy.¹²

On August 15, 1947, Pakistan gained its independence from India. It was comprised of four regions in East Pakistan--Baluchistan, Punjab, Sind and the Northwest Frontier Province, or Khyber-Pakhtukhwa--and one in East Pakistan called Bengal.¹³ In order to curry favor and establishing representation within each province, the Muslim League brought the provinces under a central government but also assured the provinces each would retain its individual autonomy. These promises of maintaining provincial control under central authority caused political dissatisfaction with the new government from within the provinces of Pakistan. This political dissatisfaction created religious and tribal tensions with the Muslim League's decisions geared towards uniting these once semiautonomous provinces. This resulted in conflicting provincial identities, an unwillingness to sacrifice one's own provincial Islamic belief and submit to the idea of a single Islamic belief under a sovereign Muslim state. The assurances of provincial autonomy made by the Muslim League and its leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah may not have directly

¹¹ Talbot, 66.

¹² Jaffrelot, 17.

¹³ Radio Free Europe Radio Library, "Name Change Closer for Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province," News / From Our Bureaus, http://www.rferl.org/content/Name_Change_Closer_For_Pakistans_North_West_Frontier_Province_/2000322.html (accessed June 6, 2010). In 2010, the Pakistan's parliament renamed the Northwest Frontier province Khyber Pakhtukhwa. The name change became official within the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of 1973.

conflicted with the vision of a sovereign Muslim state, but the effects of forming the Muslim state generated competition between the five ethnic provincial identities.¹⁴

The conflicting provincial ideas of what a Muslim state would be had a profound influence on the post-colonial political developments. These struggles were highlighted by poor organization of the provincial representation of the Muslim League, the emerging conflict between regional and national identities, and a low level of political culture leading to the ambiguity over the future of Pakistan under the Muslim League's control.¹⁵ The effects, created through the formation of Pakistan, were the catalyst to their current problems. Francis Robinson, a respected author on Indian affairs, identified three factors that connect Pakistan's political issues to a series of reoccurring political developments in the Muslim Leagues desire for integration of the Muslim majority provinces in India:

First that the Muslim separatist politics were primarily a phenomenon of UP [United Provinces]; second, that the developments at the centre rather than the wishes of the Muslim majority area politicians led to the strengthening of a Muslim-Pakistan political identity during the pre-partition decade; third, that the possible exception of Bengal, none of the provinces which came to form Pakistan possessed either a widespread positive identification with a Muslim-Pakistan political identity, or sufficiently developed political institutions to sustain it.¹⁶

The difficulties with establishing Pakistan can be traced back to its origins and the Muslim League's desire to rapidly establish a counter reflecting its own vision. As a result of this hasty establishment, a series of events began the political transformation of Pakistan from a democratic Muslim state to a military dictatorship.¹⁷

¹⁴ Talbot, 93.

¹⁵ Talbot, 141-146. Talbot highlights "the incipient clash between regional and 'Pakistani' identities. Within Bengal for example the Muslim League's popular base of support rested on regional interests and the identities, which were difficult to harmonize with Jinnah's All-India understanding of the Pakistan demand. Similar difficulties were present in Sindh, Punjab, and the Frontier."

¹⁶ Francis Robinson, 'Origins' in W.E. James and Subroto Roy (eds.), *Foundations of Pakistan's Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990's* (Sage Publishing: New Delhi, 1992), 33-58.

¹⁷ Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India* (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2006), 372.

The Muslim Leagues efforts to establish Pakistan as a democratic Muslim state created instability and generated the mass migration of over 12.5 million people between Pakistan and India. The results of the instability caused by the migration led to a series of regime changes orchestrated by the military because of the Pakistani government's difficulty in addressing the issues cause by the resettlement of the Muslims and Hindus within their country. This political transformation process began with a decision by the central government that conflicted with the urban elite or rural agrarian, based on tribal or religious affiliation. This led to a violent reaction by the national government. Once the military viewed the violence as a threat to the sovereignty of Pakistan, which it believed occurred for reasons of political ineptitude or corruption, it would establish martial law. After the military perceived that the threat had decreased, it dissolved martial law and implemented a new government, usually with a military leader, and the cycle would start again. Each time this occurred, the government recreated or amended the Constitution in an effort to further centralize power within the government.¹⁸ Author Lawrence Ziring summarizes the culmination of the centralization of the Pakistani government's power through constitutional reform in his book *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*. Ziring's impression of the Mohammad Zia uh Haq regime's changes to the Constitution of 1973 were that they "focused less on the limitation of government power and more on the need to strengthen executive rule."¹⁹ These constitutional changes empowered the Pakistani military to intervene with the central government and restore order four times within nineteen years.²⁰ More significantly, with every new regime came a revised interpretation of what Pakistan's national identity should be.

¹⁸ Talbot, 132. Talbot supports this claim by stating, "Recent research thus underlies the importance of understanding the decline of Pakistan's parliamentary system not in just terms of corruption, chaos and social disorder. It was in fact rooted far more complexly in the bureaucratic traditions and political culture inherited from the colonial era and in the centralizing solutions which accompanied the construction of the state in a context of financial constraint and strategic insecurity."

¹⁹ Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, 171.

²⁰ Shuja Nowaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 587-588.

The Constitution Bill enacted on February 29 1956 marked the beginning of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and established in power its new president Iskander Mirza. Civil unrest broke out when the bureaucracy could not decide on whether the National Assembly elections would be unified or conducted separately between the provinces in the East and West. This decision by the central government led to violence in Dhaka in East Pakistan, where the death of Deputy Speaker Shahid during a debate over industrial unrest and inflation forced President Mirza to take action.

In 1958, Mirza's justified the implementation of martial law when he stated it was "because of the politician's struggle for power and the prostitution of Islam."²¹ Military intervention came when Mirza and General Ayub Kahn could not agree on land reform issues, military appointments, and when to lift martial law.²² On October 27, 1958, Mirza and his wife left Pakistan by direction of the military and were exiled to England. The ousting of Iskander Mirza began what would become a paradigm shift of intervention in the government by the military. This state of affairs in Pakistan led General Ayub Kahn to assume the role of president and create a new Constitution, completing the first of three political transformations in Pakistan. These political transformations created inconsistency and sudden change in Pakistani government that ultimately stunted the growth of the legislative process.

After General Ayub Kahn gained control of Pakistani government, he lifted the martial law Mirza imposed in 1958. Ensuring that his vision of Pakistan would leave an indelible mark on Pakistan's history, the Ayub regime enacted the Constitution of 1962. This document attempted to promote modernization and began to depoliticize Pakistan's governmental process.²³ The Constitution of 1962 reflected the years of martial law that Ayub oversaw. It denied the

²¹ Talbot, 146.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid., 183.

Pakistanis Basic Democracies an electoral college, the voice of political parties, a bicameral legislature, and a Vice President.²⁴

By the end of 1962, Ayub Kahn faced a public outcry over what his 1956 changes to the Constitution. Ian Talbot states that,

The non-participation of the Bengali elite, in the tightly controlled political process and in the centralized administration had accelerated the process of alienation historically rooted in economic disparity and in the ethnocentrism of the West Pakistan establishment.²⁵

As a result of the violence from his political decisions, Ayub waived on his position of depoliticizing the government and reversed his policies. This led to The First Constitutional Amendment Act of 1963. This reversal in Ayub's policy was viewed publically as political inadequacy, and it shifted whatever public power he had left to his political opponents.²⁶

Pakistan began to see its relationship with the United States weaken. In an effort to receive military and economic assistance, Pakistan sought a favorable relationship with the United States. During the fighting in the Jammu-Kashmir region between India and Pakistan, the United States-Pakistan relationship started to unravel. By supporting both India and Pakistan with military support, the United States was concerned that it was encouraging an arms race between them. Combined with the political strains from the Kennedy and Johnson administration's commitment to the long-term security of India and the United States' involvement in the Viet Nam War, the United States-Pakistan relationship turned into notional alliance at best.

²⁴ Ibid., 157. This came from Aybu Kahn's overriding the advisory recommendations of the Constitution Commission's report, which had been presented on 6 May 1961.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 158. "The Jamaat-I-Islami (JI) (Islamic Movement) The Islamist movement which was founded by Maulana Ala Maududi in 1942 in opposition to the Muslim League led Pakistan movement. It opposed both the secularist orientation of the League leadership and the modernist reconciliation of the nation-state concept with Islam." Talbot further elaborates on JI's response to the Ayub Kahn regime, "Almost immediately the JI reorganized itself. Its Leader Maulala Maududi fired off volleys of criticism at the anti-Islamic and anti-democratic features of the regime from his Zaildar Park Lahore headquarters. The Makazi Majlis-Shura (Central Council), which met in Lahore during the first week in August 1962, passed resolutions which condemned among other things the official Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology, the Muslim Family Laws, the Pakistan Arts Council, the Girl Guides and the Blue Birds, the construction of cinemas and the importation of books critical to Islam.

Although wanting to maintain ties to the United States Ayub Kahn began to move towards friendlier relations with China, a move that the United States would view as contrary to its interests and Pakistan's alliance obligations.²⁷ When Johnson left the White House, the United States -Pakistan relationship was at a "stand off" over the United States' military assistance to India, and Pakistan's blossoming relationship with China.²⁸ The Second Indio-Pakistan war, which began in 1965, and the increasing United States involvement in Viet Nam, combined to exacerbate tensions between the United States and Pakistan.²⁹

In the end, it was Ayub Kahn's domestic policies that were his downfall. In an effort to move toward a more centralized government, Ayub Kahn's decision to ban political parties caused Pakistan to erupt in widespread civil unrest. According to Talbot, the end of Ayub Kahn's regime was characterized by, "exacerbating regional and class inequalities, and failed to address the state's longstanding legitimization problems."³⁰ The Pakistani military began to question whether a democratically elected government provided the essential governance necessary to preserve the Muslim state.³¹ As a result of the civil unrest, the Ayub Kahn regime implemented

²⁷ Kux, 141.

²⁸ Ibid., 176-177. Kux elaborates on the Johnson-Kahn relationship, "In his rough-hewn Texan fashion, Johnson twisted Ayub's arm to limit Pakistan's relationship with Beijing as the price for continued large-scale economic aid. When the pressure tactics failed and Pakistan and India went to war over Kashmir in 1965, Johnson largely gave up on Pakistan."

²⁹ Ibid, Kux. expands on the Pakistani perception of the U.S. in the 1960's, "After the United States not only refused to help against India during the 1965 war but suspend aid, the Pakistanis felt betrayed. As the alliance relationship shriveled, the one substantial quid pro quo that Pakistan had provided the Americans—the Badaber intelligence facility—became a casualty. For all practical purposes, the U.S.-Pakistan alliance became a notional affair by the time Pakistan's old friend Richard Nixon defeated Vice President Hubert Humphrey in the 1968 presidential elections.

³⁰ Talbot, 184.

³¹ Ibid. Talbot summarizes the Ayub Kahn regime as the "inability to establish 'a genuine participatory political process' ensured for example that his anti-disparity measures failed to placate Bengali grievances. The regime, which had been expected by Western 'neo-realists' to demonstrate a superior ability to its civilian predecessors in initiating 'development', instead provided empirical support for the contention that Third World military governments are a bound by economic, social and political constraints as are democracies.

martial law and ceded control of Pakistan to General Yahya Kahn in March of 1969. Although his tenure lasted for only a year, the Yahya Kahn regime was responsible for the loss of Bengal.

The loss of East Pakistan can be directly linked Yahya Kahn's denial of the Bengali's democratic desires. Because of the civil unrest in Bengal over diverging political trajectories and aspirations, Yahya began a pre-emptive strike that sparked a civil war leading to the breakup of East and West Pakistan. The result of the civil war between East and West Pakistan, and the subsequent military campaign called "Operation Searchlight", was the loss of half of Pakistan's Navy, a quarter of its Air Force and a third of its Army. This resulted in 93,000 Pakistani prisoners, national outrage, and the loss of East Pakistan. The loss of East Pakistan in particular directly threatened the sovereignty of Pakistan, leading to Yahya Kahn's dismissal from public office. When the military did assume the role of the caretaker government, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator (CLMA), thus marking the end of yet another political transformation. The results of Bhutto's political decisions were the tipping point for the people of Pakistan to question the effectiveness of an elected central government.³²

With the loss of East Pakistan and a series of failed regimes, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began to lay a foundation of social reform leading to the final political transformation. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's fledgling socialist Pakistan's Peoples Party (PPP) promised the elimination of feudalism and the advances of the interests of the peasantry.³³ Like his predecessors, Bhutto changed the Constitution of 1963 to reflect his vision of nationalization, which was a vehicle to implement changes in land and labor reform.³⁴ The significance of these changes made Bhutto popular with the rural and working class within Pakistan. His platform of uniting the people of Pakistan under the founding principles of "Islam is our faith, Democracy is our politics, Socialism is our

³² Ibid., 185-213.

³³ Pakistan Peoples Party, "Towards Peace and Prosperity in Pakistan," Manifesto 2008, <http://www.ppp.org.pk/manifestos/2008.pdf> (accessed February 12, 2010)

³⁴ Talbot, 214.

economy, All Power to the People,” inspired nationalism in the Pakistanis and portrayed a stable government to the West.³⁵

During the Bhutto regime, he focused his efforts on social and economic reforms and improving the impoverished people. His style of “egalitarian democracy” and the “application of socialist ideas to realize economic and social justice” transformed Pakistan through social and political recovery stemming from years of military rule.³⁶ Under his rule, the Constitution of 1973 gave Islam a role within the government and by doing so, helped resolve the issues of autonomy within the provinces.³⁷ The Bhutto regime was responsible for Pakistan’s first steel mill, the hydro electric dam on the Indus River at Tarbela, and self-sufficiency in the areas of fertilizer, sugar, and cement.³⁸

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was beginning to make progress in Pakistan, but he was also beginning to make political enemies as well. In addition to being charismatic, Talbot asserts that Bhutto’s political style was “combative and confrontational.”³⁹ While he was popular with the citizens of Pakistan, he also created a rift within the military ranks, owing to his measures to limit military authority in the Constitution of 1973.⁴⁰ Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan concurred with Talbot’s assertion in his memoirs, saying that, “Bhutto was a mendacious, vindictive, ‘showman of high calibre’ and that his engineering of the downfall of the NAP-JUI (National Awami Party-Jamiat-Ul-I-Islami) coalition ministries in the Frontier and Baluchistan [and]

³⁵ Pakistan Peoples Party.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Talbot, 218.

³⁸ Pakistan Peoples Party.

³⁹ Talbot, 216.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 213. Talbot elaborated on Bhutto’s uneasiness with the military and the changes he implemented in the Constitution of 1973: “A number of clauses in the 1973 Constitution were specifically designed to discourage future military intervention. Its third schedule contained an oath which serving members of the military were to take forswearing political activities of any kind. Article 245 defined high treason as any attempt to abrogate or subvert the constitution ‘by the use of force or by other unconstitutional means.’”

displayed an authoritarianism equal to that of any martial law era.”⁴¹ This rift between the military and government caused Bhutto to make an unprecedented move by elevating General Mohammad Zia ul Haq—a virtual unknown within Pakistan’s military elite—to the level of Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Bhutto’s attempts to limit the military’s political influence and infuse new personnel to the senior military levels created deeper fissures in the rift with the military elite.

By the mid 1970’s the Bhutto regime began to enjoy the results of his nationalization program. He was popular with his constituents and had a foreign policy that was seen favorably by the United States. In an effort to keep pace militarily with India, Bhutto furthered Pakistan’s covert nuclear program. This state of affairs would change by March 1977. As tensions grew within the PPP and its loss of support by key segments of the population, Bhutto’s victory in the national election would come under scrutiny. The opposition claimed that the results were rigged, and the military began to question whether intervention was required to restore order. By the end of April 1977, amidst a public outcry and considerable violence, the military imposed martial law and General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq—with the assistance of the senior leadership in the military—initiated a bloodless coup to restore order. Unlike his predecessors, Bhutto and his family were able to remain in Pakistan instead of being exiled. Ultimately, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s regime came to an end because those groups who elevated him to power had become alienated.⁴²

⁴¹ Gul Hassan Kahn, *Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Kahn* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 15.

⁴² Talbot, 242. Talbot cites that, “Of greater importance was the loss of support of two key groups they had brought the *Quaid-i-Awam* (Leader of the Masses) to power. The first comprised the professional elites and students who were alienated by the increased stifling of political expression through the banning of the NAP and the use Section 144 of the Penal Code, the High Treason Act, Prevention of Anti-National Activities Ordinance and the Press and Publications Ordinance. The lower middle class formed the second key support group which defected to the opposition. Once again Punjab held the key to power in Pakistani politics and it was the loss of support among the small traders, merchants and shopkeepers of this province, which proved crucial.”

On April 6, 1979, the United States suspended aid to Pakistan because of its refusal to halt its nuclear program. Pakistan viewed these sanctions as unfair, citing that nothing was done to India for detonating a nuclear device in 1974.⁴³ Moreover, the economic sanctions highlighted Pakistani perceptions of United States favoritism towards India. These sanctions would have lasting consequences in the relations between the United States and Pakistan in the 1980s.

By the end of the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto regime, Pakistan had been led by five heads of state, with all but one of them ending in regime change through military intervention. While an average of four-year presidential terms seems reasonable, the drastic shift in vision and policy from one president to another and the lack of matured long-term projects stunted the development of Pakistan. Although each president attempted to unite Pakistan under a united Islamic government, they failed to address tensions within provincial, ethnic, and tribal identities. Each time this culminated in unrest resulting from unfavorable political decisions. This in turn elevated the military's concern about the sovereignty of the Muslim state, generated its intervention, and produced a coup followed by martial law. The martial law under Mohammad Zia ul Haq that followed the Bhutto regime lasted from 1977 until 1986. During this period, militant Islam flourished and elevated the *mujahedeen* who later defeated the Soviet Union. The organizations that formed the *mujahedeen* evolved into a threat to the West and the sovereignty of Pakistan.

Zia's Vision of Pakistan under Islam: An Islamic Pakistan

In 1977, Zia ul Haq's regime established martial law to restore order to Pakistan in the wake of what some believed to be a fraudulent election. More importantly, the military reasserted itself as the custodian of Pakistan after a humiliating defeat to India and the loss of East Pakistan. Zia ul Haq's Islamization program attempted to succeed where his predecessors programs had failed. Zia's vision of government rule differed from those before him. By limiting the autonomy

⁴³ Kux, 238.

of the provinces and focusing on a creating an Islamic government, his efforts at centralization improved the control the Pakistani government had on their economy. Zia reduced some of the corruption by personally deciding to where and to whom the funding went. This personal approach resulted in deeper fissures between Zia and the groups that did not receive equal or less funding. This section will focus on the years of the Islamization of Pakistan. It will explore how the programs set into motion by Mohammad Zia ul Haq and the groups he supported through the Islamization program shaped the human landscape in Pakistan by paving the way for the growth of militant Islam. This change in the policy and the rise of militant Islam within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) can be attributed to three factors: the isolated area within which it had to organize, the personal desire by Muslims to be part of those militant organizations, and the substantial funding that was made available to these groups. Zia's Islamization process, and the social effects on Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War, provided the context within which those three factors flourished.

Mohammed Zia ul Haq was born in 1924 to a modest family from Jullundur in Punjab. His modest upbringing greatly influenced the Islamic vision and direction Zia brought to the Pakistani government. Before the Partition with India, his family moved to Peshawar, where he joined the military during the opening of military service during the Second World War. This enabled Zia to obtain a commission "without either being neither a landowner nor a member of the martial castes."⁴⁴ This was a major accomplishment for someone not established within the military caste.

Compared to those of his peers, Zia's military career was relatively ordinary until he attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 1962. Afterwards he was given a number of important assignments which ultimately led to his

⁴⁴ Talbot, 255.

promotion to brigadier in 1969.⁴⁵ Upon his return to Pakistan, Zia served with the First Armored Division for three years and remained relatively unknown in the circles of the Pakistani senior military.

But Zulfikar Ali Bhutto surprised the senior military leadership in the spring of 1976 by elevating Zia over more senior officers to the Chief of the Army Staff of the Pakistani military. This was done for three reasons. First, Bhutto attempted to limit the existing senior military officer's influence in the central government. Moreover, Bhutto believed that Zia's gratefulness for the opportunity ensured Zia would never questioned his authority. Finally, Zia did not participate in the civil war with East Pakistan and the humiliating surrender to India, and by doing so, was not directly responsible for the military's failures in the operation.⁴⁶ However, by the time that Zia became the Chief of the Army Staff, the Bhutto administration was intoxicated with the power that was buttressed by the adulation the leader received as a result of his lavish foreign policy. This lifestyle directly conflicted with Zia's devoutly Sunni conservative religious beliefs.

When Zia ul Haq seized control of the Pakistani government and became Pakistan's CMLA, his first act was, as Ziring states, "to inform the people of Pakistan that they were confronted with a degeneration of the political process, and witness to still another national election that ended in chaos."⁴⁷ Ziring further elucidates Zia's justification for military rule, by stating that it was "[the] responsibility of the Armed Forces and for serving the nation are in

⁴⁵ Khalid Mahmud Arif, *Working with Zia: Pakistan Power Politics, 1977-1988* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 117. Zia was second to Jordan when he helped King Hussein's forces in operations against the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

⁴⁶ Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 429. Ziring cites that, "The once vaunted bureaucracy was forced into a new mould, but the reforms centered more on politicizing the services than on instilling higher levels of efficiency. So too, the armed forces were to be refashioned, especially the army, to dispense with their penchant for political intrusions. Bhutto endeavored to recreate an armed forces that the conversant with civil control, and he selected commanders who he believed would realize his goal."

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 424.

difficult times.”⁴⁸ Instead of continuing with a series of Islamic republics mired in corruption and political chaos, Zia’s platform for change rested on his personal vision of the future of Pakistan—it would become a sovereign Islamic state led by a single ruler. This authoritarian direction gave birth to his Islamization program, much like his predecessor, his goal was to unite the various Muslim identities residing within Pakistan. This time it was under the banner of Islam

Having almost completely transformed the military from one that was reminiscent of the British system before Partition into one according to Islamic law, Zia ensured the support of the military through his implementation of Islamization.⁴⁹ Hussain Haqqani’s book, *Between Mosque and Military*, states that Zia began his reformation of the Pakistani Army almost immediately after his appointment to the Chief of Army Staff. Zia’s statement, “*Eman* (Faith), *Taqwa* (abstinence), *Jihad Fi Sabeelillah* (war in the way of or for the sake of God),” was the foundation that would bring this change about. Zia reinforced his policy when he imposed religious education in training and encouraged leaders to lead their soldiers in prayer.⁵⁰ His support for Brigadier S.K. Malik’s book, *The Quranic Concept of War*, a book that applies the Quranic principles to military strategy, is of particular interest. In the forward of the book, Zia writes,

This book brings out with simplicity, clarity and precision the Quranic philosophy on the application of military force within the context of the totality that is JEHAD. The professional soldier in a Muslim army, pursuing the goals of a Muslim state, CANNOT become ‘professional’ if all his activities he does not take on ‘the color of Allah.’⁵¹

Zia’s transformation of the military towards Islamization challenged the professional military mindset steeped in the traditions of British rule.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* 2nd Ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 251.

⁵⁰ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 112-113.

⁵¹ S.K. Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War* (Delhi: Adams Publishers, 1992), Forward.

By 1979, Zia had suspended the electoral process and claimed the role of President General for himself. In the process he oversaw the hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the exile of Benazir Bhutto. As the sole leader of Pakistan, Zia's vision and direction for an Islamization program began to take shape. His Islamization focused on mending a socially divided nation by utilizing Islam as the tie that was to bind all the various provincial identities together. The two groups on which he focused were the ethnically diverse people in the rural regions and the educated and involved members of the political economic experience that resided in Pakistan's urban areas.

His vision became fact, and he transformed Pakistan by unifying, or re-ordering, a myriad of conflicting identities and racial societies into a solitary community for which he provided the idea of the Islamic state.⁵² Zia believed that by instituting a *zayat* (alms) and *ushr* (tax) on agriculture, it assisted the poor in the rural areas. Zia also set in motion his government's intention of imposing Islamic rules by establishing courts headed by religious judges. Zia's attempts to unify Pakistan through Islamization did nothing more than alienate the legal community and undermine the cosmopolitan elite. His actions caused many of these people to move their businesses outside of Pakistan.⁵³ What followed were the events that transformed the human landscape in Pakistan into the heroin and Kalashnikov society under Zia's Islamization program.

Many consider the events that happened during 1979 a significant turning point in Islamic history across the Middle East and Asia. The noted columnist Thomas Friedman wrote in a *New York Times* opinion editorial "that the key forces shaping this region today were really set in motion between 1977 and 1979."⁵⁴ Although Friedman's comments encapsulate South Asia, his focus was primarily on the Middle East. Pakistan's desire to be an Islamic state reinforces

⁵² Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*, 442.

⁵³ Ibid., 444.

⁵⁴ Thomas L. Friedman, "1977 vs. 1979," *New York Times*, February 13, 2010, under "Opinion," <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/opinion/14friedman.html> (accessed May 21, 2010).

Friedman's comments, and its actions since 1979 confirm the understandings gained from Friedman's assertions.

Friedman's article elaborates on four key events that happened during 1979. First, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel that led to subsequent peace agreement between them was a result that was never fully embraced by the rest of the Islamic community. The second key event that happened in 1979 was the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Islamist dissidents, an action that many in the Middle East blamed on the United States. This infuriated the Muslim community in Islamabad, leading to the destruction of the United States Embassy in Pakistan.⁵⁵ The third event was the Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini over the Shah of Iran and its direct effect on the United States foreign policy in the Middle East. The fourth event was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent role that Pakistan played in the *mujahedeen* led insurgency in Afghanistan. These events paved the way for the narrative around through the fundamentalist Islamic community in the Middle East rallied to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.⁵⁶ This message states,

The Arabs and Muslims are victims of an imperialist-Zionist conspiracy aided by reactionary regimes in the Arab world. It has as its goal keeping the Arabs and Muslims backward in order to exploit their oil riches and prevent them from becoming as strong as they used to be in the Middle Ages — because that is dangerous for Israel and Western interests.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Group, 2004), 22. Steve Coll in his book *Ghost Wars*, highlights the events that took place on November 21 1979. The following quote articulates the speed at which the outrage over the seizure of the Grand Mosque had on the region and how the West was implicated in this act. "It was November 21, 1979. As the riot erupted in Pakistan, forty-nine Americans say imprisoned in the United States embassy in Tehran, trapped by Islamic radical students and Iranian revolutionary militia who announced that day a [sic] plan to murder the hostages by suicide explosion if any attempt was made to rescue them. In Mecca, Saudi Arabia, the holiest city in the Islamic world, Saudi national guardsmen encircled the Grand Mosque in pursuit of a failed theology student who had announced that he was the Mahdi, or Savior, dispatched to Earth by Allah as forecast in the Koran."

⁵⁶ Thomas L. Friedman, "1977 vs. 1979," *New York Times*, February 13, 2010, under "Opinion," <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/opinion/14friedman.html> (accessed May 21,2010).

⁵⁷ Ibid.

This narrative differed from Pakistan's reasoning for becoming involved in the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Simply put, the Soviets presence threatened the sovereignty of Pakistan. By the end of the Soviet Afghan War, the divergent views of the Islamists global narrative and the regional Islamic narrative held by Zia and his supporters, was causing unrest in the FATA between these two groups.

David Lesch's book, *1979, The Year That Shaped the Modern Middle East*, explores the history surrounding the events that Friedman cites. Lesch expands further on the United States' role in the Middle East through the end of the Cold War. He states that America's goal in the Middle East was fourfold. It set out to prevent Soviet expansion, promote stability in the region to ensure safe transport, assure ease of access to affordable oil, and to protect Israel.⁵⁸ This policy explains the actions of the United States over the subsequent decade, and it provides insight into why it funded the *mujahedeen* through Pakistan in the Soviet Afghan War.

In December 1979, the Soviet Army entered Afghanistan to provide assistance to the Soviet backed Hafizullah Amin regime. This move was the first time since 1920 that the Soviet government attempted to conquer a country outside the Communist Bloc.⁵⁹ Zia now had to watch both of his borders for a threat to Pakistan's sovereignty. The invasion was of obvious concern to the United States too. No longer having diplomatic relations with Iran, and with the Soviets in Afghanistan, the need to repair relations with the Pakistanis became increasingly important.

America's concern over Soviet expansionism during the Cold War provided Zia's regime potential political leverage against the United States. Because the United States realized Pakistan's strategic location within South Asia and considered its relationship with the Pakistani military in good stead, it found comfort with Zia's military regime leading Pakistan instead of

⁵⁸ David W. Lesch, *1979: The Year That Shaped the Modern Middle East* (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2001), 121.

⁵⁹ Richard Pipes, "To the Editor," *New York Times*, Jan 2, 1980, Letters.

Bhutto's socialist PPP. Talbot argues the United States resolved to reinitiate diplomatic relations with Pakistan when he wrote, "The outbreak of the conflict ended the Zia regime's diplomatic isolation and forced the Americans to reappraise their security arrangements."⁶⁰ This growing relationship between the United States and Pakistan over the next decade, coupled with Zia's Islamization of Pakistan, reinforced the propensity for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism within Pakistan.

The growth of militant Islam in Pakistan found its origins during the Soviet-Afghan War in the western region of Pakistan, particularly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The FATA and surrounding areas in western Pakistan hosted the refugees from Afghanistan as well as Islamic fundamentalists from outside of Pakistan. Historically, the FATA was a byproduct of the establishment of the Durand Line: The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, created at the end of the nineteenth century by the British, was designed to divide the Pashtun tribe and destabilize their influence.⁶¹ The ambiguity of the exact location and lack of Pashtun observance of this disputed border created instability between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The FATA, created as a buffer between Afghanistan and British India, had little representation in the Pakistani central government.⁶² This lack of central government involvement limited Zia's control of the FATA and the surrounding provinces. Many foreign militants and Afghan refugees received training at Pakistan funded madrassas and experienced

⁶⁰ Talbot, 267.

⁶¹ Shuja Nawaz, *FATA-A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenges of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan* (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 6. Nawaz cites, "Some 15 million Pashtuns inhabit Afghanistan while about 25 million inhabit Pakistan, of which FATA is an important part because it contains tribes that straddle the Durand Line, the disputed border between British India and then Pakistan and Afghanistan."

⁶² Ibid. Nawaz claims that the reason for the militant culture in the FATA stems from a historical precedent of lack of government involvement. He states, "Traditionally, FATA political representatives tended to side with whatever government was in power in Pakistan. But the lack of political participation has also created a sense of deprivation of rights and alienation from Pakistan proper. The intrusion of religion-based politics in the region has changed the situation now and the state can no longer rely upon blind support from FATA representatives."

fighting either the Soviets in Afghanistan or supporting them from the tribal areas within Pakistan. According to Zahid Hussein in his book, *Frontline Pakistan*, the objective of the jihadist movement in the 1980s and 1990s was not to establish a global Islamic caliphate, but its efforts were more aligned to the regional strategy within Pakistan and the “liberation of the Kashmir region and the installation of a Pashtu Islamist government in Afghanistan.”⁶³ This explains the role of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and its influence in the tribal areas. Moreover, it elucidates how the ISI synchronized international support and distributed money and arms to the insurgent groups fighting the Soviets.

It was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who initiated the ISI’s involvement in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as the Northwest Frontier Province) in the 1970s. During the violence associated with the independence movement in Baluchistan, and civil unrest in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Pakistani leadership became distrustful of the Pashtu and Balochi Intelligence Bureau (IB) officers. This resulted in a need to establish political cells in these regions.⁶⁴ These political cells were run by the ISI, and in turn created a relationship between the Pakistani sponsored *mujahedeen* and the ISI. It was the ISI’s responsibility to coordinate the distribution of financial and military support from the central government to the *mujahedeen*.

With the influx of refugees into the FATA, and the Islamization process ongoing, Zia used the ISI like his predecessors before him, by keeping a close eye on those who would be likely to overthrow him.⁶⁵ Bidanda Chengappa states that the ISI monitored not only key

⁶³ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam* (Columbia University Press: New York, 2007), 55.

⁶⁴ Bidanda M. Chengappa, *Pakistan’s Fifth Estate: Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate* (Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses: New Delhi, 2000), 17.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

members of the PPP but the Bhutto family too.⁶⁶ According to Benazir Bhutto, in her book *Daughter of the East*, the ISI went so far as to keep track of her while she was in exile in London.⁶⁷ But it was the role of recruiting and supporting the *mujahedeen* in western Pakistan that the ISI would play in influencing the regional outcome of the Soviet-Afghan War.

The Soviet military occupation in Afghanistan changed the strained relationship between the Afghans and Pakistanis. What was once a relationship of mutual distrust characterized by disagreement over the establishment of the Durand Line turned into a relationship of cooperation.⁶⁸ This cooperation, reinforced by Islamabad's decision authorizing sanctuary for refugees and fighters in Pakistan, allowed for one of the largest refugee movements in history of the modern world.⁶⁹ The cost of allowing the refugees to enter into Pakistan was the further destabilization of the FATA and other western provinces that resulted: The refugees became a major recruiting source for the *mujahedeen*.

The refugee issue quickly became a problem for the Zia regime. An estimated 3,000,000 refugees, the largest displaced population in the world, resided in the Pakistani tribal areas. The fighting in Afghanistan pushed the heroin factories across the Durand Line into the tribal areas, and in turn made the area the largest supplier of heroin to Europe and the Americas.⁷⁰ The result of providing assistance to the Afghan refugee situation, and the lack of central government and

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Benazir Bhutto, *Daughter of the East: An Autobiography* (Hamish Hamilton: London, 1988), 218, 219.

⁶⁸ Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, 175-176. Ziring elaborates on the change in the relationship with Afghanistan and the contested Durand Line. He cites, "The call to Pakistani Muslims to band together, to overcome their differences, to protect their Islamic heritage now attained a resonance not experienced previously. Zia needed no further convincing that destiny had called him to save Pakistan, to bind up its wounds, and prepare the nation for the struggle that lay ahead. In Zia's thinking, only Islam offered the integrating factor that linked Pakistanis with one another, and also Pakistan with the Muslims of Afghanistan. Although the two countries were long adversaries across a troubled Durand Line, Pakistan's assistance to the Afghan refugee community as well as to the mujahidin resistance changed their relationship in the most dramatic manner."

⁶⁹ Chengappa. 22.

⁷⁰ Nowaz. 317.

political representation in the FATA added to the complexity of uniting Pakistan's diverse Muslim culture that Zia tried to mend through Islamization. Although the refugees strengthened the local economies in Baluchistan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the financial benefits of having the refugees in Pakistan never transcended to the other provinces. To further compound the problem, the refugee population migrated to the urban areas within Pakistan. The resettlement of these refugees throughout Pakistan is credited with the riots in Karachi in 1985-86.⁷¹ The drugs and violence imported into Pakistan from the resettlement of the Afghan refugees posed a problem to Pakistani government with which it would continue to struggle.⁷²

The funding to grow these militant organizations came from various sources. By 1981, the United States became a major source of military and financial support to the *mujahedeen*. After reinstating aid to Pakistan, President Reagan offered a menu of incentives to Pakistan, which included an increase in aid to Pakistan by providing \$3.2 billion dollars over five years. More importantly, the Pakistanis were able to pursue their covert nuclear ambitions without fear of United States sanctions.⁷³ With the United States and Saudi Arabia backing the *mujahedeen* and a safe haven in Pakistan, the insurgent forces were able to rearm and regroup without fear of the Soviets interdicting their bases. As a result of the *mujahedeen's* early successes, the CIA began to further their covert war against the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnost (KGB) and its Afghan counterparts, the *Khadamat-e Etela'at-e Dawlati* (KHAD). This alignment was to preserve the Cold War paradigm and to any deny overt superpower confrontation.⁷⁴

The Soviet's goal in relation to Pakistan was fourfold. First, the Soviets planned to intimidate the Pakistanis with the hope of stopping the support to the *mujahedeen*. Second, they wanted to force Islamabad to comply on the terms of an Afghanistan led political settlement.

⁷¹ Talbot, 269.

⁷² Nowaz, 371.

⁷³ Ibid., 377.

⁷⁴ Chengappa, 23.

Third, they sought to influence the reduction of the cooperation with China and the United States. Last, they intended to set in motion a program to replace the Zia regime with one that resembles the relationship the Soviet Union shares with Finland.⁷⁵ Lt General (ret) K.M. Arif wrote in his memoirs that the KGB and KHAD made “deep inroads” into Pakistan’s tribal areas. He went on to elaborate on their intent to create instability and undermine the Pakistani government’s legitimacy.⁷⁶ Like the United States, the Soviets identified Pakistan as a key component in winning the war Afghanistan.

Zia did not want an overt United States presence in Pakistan to justify a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. George Crile wrote, “Zia was the ultimate authority in Pakistan...that he was the one who would ultimately decide how much to let the pot boil in Afghanistan.”⁷⁷ Because of this, the CIA left the ISI to decide which *mujahedeen* leaders received military equipment, funding, and how much. By allowing ISI to provide more equipment to whomever they chose, the CIA was unable to influence the actions of the *mujahedeen* without assistance from the ISI. This action reinforced the longstanding relationships that the ISI established before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, but it created tension with the non-Pashtun organizations within the *mujahedeen* the CIA wanted funded as well.⁷⁸

By the fall of 1985 Pakistan was showing signs of what Asif Zardari referred to as the “heroin and Kalashnikov” culture, a term that Edward Girardet coined in his book *Afghanistan: The Soviet War*.⁷⁹ McCoy’s book, *The Heroin Culture*, estimated that in 1980 there were 5000 recorded cases of heroin addiction in Pakistan; By 1985, the numbers were over 1.3 million

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Arif, 316.

⁷⁷ George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 351.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 199.

⁷⁹ Asif Zardari, “How To Mend Fences With Pakistan,” *New York Times*, December 9, 2009, under “Opinion,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/opinion/10zardari.html> (accessed December 09, 2009); Edward Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1986), 67.

users.⁸⁰ The heroin problem was a direct result of the refugees coming from Afghanistan; the Kalashnikov came from aid supplied by the United States, Saudi Arabia, China and the United Kingdom, with the aim of assisting the *mujahedeen* in defeating the Soviets.⁸¹

After six years of fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, the *mujahedeen*'s reputation was good, but they were not achieving decisive results against the Soviet military. What changed the nature of war in Afghanistan was the introduction of the Stinger missile. By 1985, the Soviets relied more on air power to fight the *mujahedeen*.⁸² When United States supplied the Stinger missile and anti armor technology to the insurgents, the *mujahedeen* began to achieve decisive effects against the Soviet air and armored threats on the battlefields of Afghanistan. With the support from the United States Saudi Arabia, and others, Pakistan continued to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. In 1986, the United States supported Pakistan with another \$4.02 billion in aid over the following six years and also rescheduled and wrote off part of its debt.⁸³ The total amount of money that Pakistan received by Islamist charities and foreign countries cannot be easily calculated, but estimates put the amount close to \$40 billion dollars at the end of the Soviet-Afghan War.⁸⁴

Personnel filling the ranks of the *mujahedeen* came from the Afghan refugees and outside countries. Pakistani officials gave the *mujahedeen* the unofficial responsibility of registering the refugees, unintentionally creating a linkage between refugee aid and membership in the

⁸⁰ Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, Colombia* (HarperCollins: New York, 2003), 480.

⁸¹ Nowaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 371.

⁸² Crile, 407.

⁸³ Haqqani, 188.

⁸⁴ Dilip Hiro, "The Cost of an Afghan 'Victory'," *The Nation*, Feb 15, 1999. Under "Article." <http://www.thenation.com/article/cost-afghan-victory>. (accessed 27 May, 2010).

mujahedeen.⁸⁵ Zia also allowed volunteers from outside Pakistan's borders to fight alongside the *mujahedeen*. This fit into his pan-Islamic vision, but that vision was a regional one at best.

Journalist Ziaul Islam Ansari, a Zia confidant wrote,

Pakistan would be turned into a self sufficient, stable and strong country with a strong position within the Islamic world, South Asia, and West Asia, capable of providing strength to Islamic revivalist movements in adjoining countries and regions. This includes the region of the Far East that has become distant from us because of the loss of East Pakistan. [This Pakistan sphere of influence] comprises the region encompassing the area from Afghanistan to Turkey, including Iran and the Muslim majority states of the Soviet Union in Central Asia.⁸⁶

Zia's pan-Islamic vision did not reflect the Arab's narrative, which called for assisting in the jihad against the Soviet Union, but, because it was based on its own agenda, it essentially contributed to the spread of a global militant Islam.⁸⁷

The decline of the Zia regime became as a result of the events in the late 1980s. His fall from power was the result of the conflicts between five groups—the ISI, the religious fundamentalists, the Pakistani government, the people of Pakistan, and the military. In 1986, Zia lifted eight years of martial law and held a national election. As a result of those National Assembly elections, Zia came to share the responsibility for Pakistan's political affairs with his

⁸⁵ Haqqani, 90.

⁸⁶ Ziaul Islam Ansari, *General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq: Shakhshait aur Karnamay* [General Zia ul-Haq: The Man and His Achievements] (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1990), 24.

⁸⁷ Jaffrelot, 140. Jefferlot writes about the breakdown of two networks of militants Pakistan recruited to fight the Soviets. Basically ones that were educated in the madrasah's in Pakistan and others that were recruited from outside Pakistan. He supports this claim by stating, "The second network covered Islamist movements, which recruited -- in Afghanistan as elsewhere—among educated youth and the few professors of their theology trained in Egypt under the influence of the Muslim Brothers. These militants—who, unlike the traditionalist ulemas, were working for a real political revolution—found two sponsors in Pakistan: the Islamist Jamaat-I Islami Party, led by Maududi until his death in 1979; and the Pakistani army service known since the Afghan War as the ISI. This double sponsorship (Islamist Networks and secret services) would be a permanent feature of Pakistan's regional policy on Islamic movements. But Pakistan was clever enough to allow most of the Afghan resistance movements to open offices on its territory, giving them monopoly control of refugees by allowing them to register only on the condition that they belonged to a recognized organization [*tanzim*].

new Prime Minister, Muhammad Kahn Junejo. Zia selected Junejo hoping to reduce the Sindhi angst for his regime and to overshadow Benazir Bhutto's election campaign against him.⁸⁸

Zia attempted to limit Junejo's authority in certain areas, particularly in matters of the Soviet-Afghan War, but it did not stop him from intervening in the conduct of Pakistan's government.⁸⁹ It was Junejo who initiated the call to lift martial law, reinstate the political parties, and free political officials from prison.⁹⁰ These actions by Junejo, although necessary for the improvement of Pakistan, were also designed to give credibility to the office of the Prime Minister, a position that Zia dissolved when he took control of Pakistan in 1977.⁹¹ This created a strained relationship between Zia and Junejo, which Talbot describes as one that started out as "cordial and led to coolness."⁹² This "coolness" caused Zia to dismiss Junejo, an act the people of Pakistan interpreted as a sign of growing political weakness of the Zia government.⁹³

By the late 1980s, Zia was pleased by the defeat of the Soviets at the hands of the *mujahedeen*. After the Geneva Accords of 1988, Zia and the ISI wanted to ensure that the new government in Afghanistan had a Pakistan friendly Pashtun leader. This alignment of Afghanistan's new government with Pakistan had ensured a secure western border since Zia assumed control.⁹⁴ His members choice was Gulbuddin Hekmatyer, a Pashtun fundamentalist and *mujahedeen* leader of Hezib-i-Islami, who received the bulk of military aid funneled through the ISI.⁹⁵

⁸⁸ Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, 190.

⁸⁹ Haqqani 194.

⁹⁰ Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, 190.

⁹¹ Talbot, 263.

⁹² Ibid., 262.

⁹³ Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, 200.

⁹⁴ Nowaz, 383.

⁹⁵ Coll, 119.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Zia had little to show domestically for the unification of Pakistan under the banner of Islam. The only bright light for the Zia regime was a stable economy supported by foreign money, the United States blind eye to his nuclear program, and the end to the Soviet influence on his western border. However, the majority of those who supported him throughout his tenure no longer shared his vision of a Pakistan united under Islam.

By 1988, Zia began to separate himself from the military. Nawaz cites, “Zia had truly become a one-man administration, aided only by his immediate team.”⁹⁶ After a little more than decade of Zia’s rule, frustrations emerged with Zia from five different organizations -- the ISI, the religious fundamentalists, the bureaucracy, the people, and most importantly, the military. These frustrations obviously ceased after Zia’s death in 1988, leaving Pakistan to rebuild their government once again.

The first tension was between Zia and the ISI. As a result of the success of the *mujahedeen* in the Soviet-Afghan War, the ISI began using insurgent forces to influence the Kashmir region. Historian, Iftikhar Malik substantiated the ISI’s influence on Pakistan during the Zia regime by stating, “the ISI has destabilized Pakistan’s fragile democracy through its unchecked interventions, unaccounted for funds, and uncompromising rivalry with other intelligence gathering agencies.”⁹⁷ This tension with the ISI was apparent when Zia decided to intervene when hostilities broke out in the Kashmir region in 1986 with no notification. Seeing the potential for a problem with India, Zia flew to New Delhi and met with Rajiv Gandhi, and the two successfully negotiated a mutual withdrawal. It was rumored that the ISI complained about Zia’s intervention ruining their insurgent campaign, exposing Pakistani agents, and jeopardizing an insurgent force in the Kashmir region.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Nowaz, 384.

⁹⁷ Iftikhar Haider Malik, *The State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 345.

⁹⁸ Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, 195.

The religious fundamentalists were dubious about Zia's true intention with Islamization and feared it was only an effort to achieve absolute power. Instead of using Islamization to promote the notion of a united Islamic state, Zia's bias towards Sunni Muslims further divided the other factions of Islam and deepened the divides of an already fractured country. Lawrence Ziring attributes much of the violence within Pakistan during the late 1980s to these religious fundamental groups, which had the goal of destabilizing the Pakistani government and undermining its legitimacy.⁹⁹

The bureaucracy was not pleased with Zia throughout the martial law era of 1979 to 1986. During his rule Zia continually made efforts to minimize the political parties, claiming they were offensive to Islam, and further strengthened his position by ratifying the Constitution of 1973 through the Eighth Amendment.¹⁰⁰ This action ensured that Zia would have the authority to dismiss the prime minister, dissolve the National Assembly, and appoint military and political officials.¹⁰¹ Zia did this to ensure he always had the power to intervene in the political process.

The unrest and unhappiness of the people of Pakistan were the culmination of the failures of all the Islamization process had promised. Talbot states, "Islam was however less effective in providing national cohesive force than Zia anticipated."¹⁰² What was originally designed to unify the diverse population of Pakistan ultimately created deeper cleavages between Muslim sects. The *ushr* (alms) and *zagt* (taxes) were not equally allocated to the different sects, particularly the Shias.¹⁰³ This led to Sunni-Shia violence, most notably in Karachi. Aside from the sectarian

⁹⁹ Ibid., 194.

¹⁰⁰ Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, 171.

¹⁰¹ Talbot, 260.

¹⁰² Ibid., 251.

¹⁰³ Nowaz, 381.

issues associated with Islamization, the people were denied personal freedom, the media was restricted, and women's rights were marginalized to a status less than a man's.¹⁰⁴

The biggest tension that Zia faced was the growing rift between his government and the military. Zia's efforts to transform the military when he was the COAS took root, but some of the senior officers showed resistance to his new changes.¹⁰⁵ Most of the senior officers in the late 1980s were commissioned in the late 1950s, well after Zia's date of commissioning. Zia felt compelled to treat them as subordinates and not colleagues.¹⁰⁶ A clear sign of the rift between the military and Zia was when the military was kept in the dark over the dismissal of Junejo. Journalist and author of the book *Crossed Swords*, Shuja Nawaz attributes this to the then serving corps commanders who were chosen by Junejo, and Zia's subordinate view of them.¹⁰⁷ Zia's reluctance to share his power, and Junejo's desire to establish the legitimacy of his office, ultimately led to his dismissal by Zia in May of 1988.¹⁰⁸

The return of Benazir Bhutto and the reinstatement of political parties deepened the rift between the people and Zia. Benazir Bhutto gained the women's support when Zia spoke out against the Muslim Family Laws, a series of laws to protect women enacted by Ayub Khan in 1961. Zia felt the strain of public discontent with Benazir's return from exile and called for elections to be held in November of 1988.¹⁰⁹ But before the elections were held, President-General Mohammed Zia ul Haq's eleven-year reign would end in a mysterious plane crash. The

¹⁰⁴ Talbot, 250-252.

¹⁰⁵ Nowaz, 385.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 384.

¹⁰⁸ Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, 200.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 202. This was a program of the Ayub Khan government in the 1960's, "A Law Commission examined the work of the courts and recommended the establishment of Family Courts to focus attention on marriage and divorce as well as the care of children...Addressing this subject that his critics argued preached a form of blasphemy, Ayub tried to comfort his compatriots, saying he had no intention of attacking Islamic teaching; that his sole concern was unlimited population growth and the threat it posed to the country's attempt to lift itself out of poverty."

crash claimed the lives of Zia, his chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, United States Ambassador Arnold Raphael, and many of the top military supporters of the Zia regime and his failed Islamization program.¹¹⁰

During the course of those eleven years, Zia's reign changed Pakistan from an Islamic republic to an Islamic state. Through Islamization, he ended the cycle of political transformations and centralized the power from a political process to a military dictatorship. In the end, Islamization aimed at unifying Pakistan, did nothing more than create deeper divides between the segments of the population that it intended to mend. More importantly, through Zia's efforts to weave Islam more deeply into the Pakistani government and its agencies, the secondary effects of Islamization created the very organizations that evolved into the Islamic fundamentalist groups that came to threaten the sovereignty of Pakistan. The growth in the strength and popularity of these insurgent groups with their narrative of global *jihad*, as well with their regional allegiances, would transform over the next ten years into the organizations that spread their message of *jihad* globally.

The Recovery of Pakistan and the Leavening of Militant Islam

The 1990s provided little basis for a stable Pakistani government. Although Pakistan wasted little time in establishing a new leader in the wake of Zia's death, it would soon see a host of internal political issues that challenged Pakistan's relationship with the United States, and its very sovereignty. Pakistan's leadership was tested again as tensions with Afghanistan and India, internal friction from religious and regional identities shaped its political policies within South Asia and the world.

The repressive Islamization program of the Zia regime gave way to leadership of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the PPP's restoration of democracy—or Democratization—in Pakistan. It was under the Democratization program, which restored the political party system to

¹¹⁰ Haqqani, 196.

Pakistan, which addressed long-standing issues of inequality and recognition of groups that were previously ignored by the central government.¹¹¹ To the West, this shift in Pakistan's domestic policy, albeit forced by the death of Zia, created a sense of optimism. Ian Talbot highlights this sense of optimism that commentators had about the stability in Pakistan when he states, "Commentators outside South Asia were if anything even more optimistic as they saw Pakistan's progress in terms of a third wave of democracy which was sweeping the globe following the ending of the Cold War and the trend of intensified communication and economic interaction."¹¹² This optimism did not last long as Pakistan's political leadership struggled to rebuild its nation and continued to mend the fissures between the religious and political groups that Islamization promised to bridge.

By the end of the Soviet-Afghan War, the United States continued to supply the ISI with weapons and money to support the *mujahedeen* that were fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The United States reduced its funding to the *mujahedeen* when the realization that the ISI backed Hekmatyar fighters and others were not going to topple the Soviet-led Najibullah Kahn regime in Afghanistan. Retired United States State Department South Asia specialist, Dennis Kux highlighted the United States' misinterpretation of the Afghan scene, when he quotes former assistant secretary for international security affairs Richard Armitage stating, "We drifted too long in 1989 and failed to understand the independent role that the ISI was playing." This independent role of the ISI as the sole distributor of money and arms to fundamentalist groups fighting in Afghanistan, solidified that the ISI began to operate without the Pakistani government's knowledge of their actions. These relationships that started under the Zia regime to

¹¹¹ Talbot, 287.

¹¹² Ibid.

insure strategic depth continued as the ISI still funded the Taliban and their fight in Afghanistan.¹¹³

Recognizing the shift in foreign policy away from Afghanistan by the United States, Pakistan's desire to keep pace with India by obtaining fissionable material for a nuclear capability became a growing source of contention with the United States. In February of 1989, President George H. W. Bush met with Benazir Bhutto in Tokyo and expressed his concerns over Pakistan's growing nuclear capability. Kux states, "In so many words, the president was signaling his desire to continue the close security relationship with Pakistan, provided Islamabad froze the nuclear program."¹¹⁴ Benazir Bhutto maintained the position that Pakistan already possessed a nuclear capability and the United States and Pakistan already had a "highly favorable" nuclear understanding.¹¹⁵ The signs of a division between the United States and Pakistan were starting to show.

By 1990, Benazir Bhutto's political strength was waning. Pakistan was losing its strategic foothold in Afghanistan by not having a Pashtun leader in Kabul and there were new tensions forming in the Kashmir region. Pakistan's sovereignty was threatened once more from both borders. The inability of Bhutto to reach a political compromise with the Najibullah regime in Kabul and to garner the political clout necessary to leverage the ISI backed *mujahedeen* hindered the refugees living in Pakistan from returning to their homes in Afghanistan. The continued

¹¹³ Matt Waldman, *The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan Insurgents* (Cambridge, MA: Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University), 12.

¹¹⁴ Kux, 300. U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley reinforced President Bush's message by bluntly warning the members of the troika, "If you take any action on the nuclear program and you go past that line...[Bush] will blow the whistle and invoke Pressler."

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

instability in Afghanistan and the Pakistani public's dissatisfaction with their government, contributed to the growing ranks of Islamic extremists within Pakistan.¹¹⁶

Benazir Bhutto's troubles were not confined to Pakistan's western border. The increased frustrations from the Kashmir Muslim youth over lack of representation within the Indian government fueled violence within the region. The Kashmiri Muslims' lack of political representation in India manifested itself into an insurgency that the Indian government took little time in blaming the Pakistani government for inciting. Instead of blaming the Kashmiri youth, India focused the blame on the Bhutto regime through what Kux states was a "support, supply and training system that had been developed for them [Pakistani Government] in Afghanistan and was redirected to aid Kashmiri struggle against the Indians."¹¹⁷ The increasing danger of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan quickly became a concern for the United States. In response to the escalating situation, President H. W. Bush sent his Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates to South Asia in May 1990 to intervene in the Kashmir conflict and confront Pakistan on their nuclear program. The Pakistani government denied any participation with the Kashmiri youth insurgency and the conflict ended with a recession of forces. More importantly, it set into motion a downward change in United States policy towards Pakistan not seen since the Carter administration.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Mariam Abou Zahab, Oliver Roy, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 13. Mariam Abou Zahab and Oliver Roy support this claim by writing about the Taliban's origins, "The Taliban recruited mainly among the students of a network of rural and Pashtun religious schools (*madrasas*), situated between Ghazni and Kandahar, which had been linked with a parent network based in Pakistan, and organized by the Deobandi school. These *madrasas* had become politicized and militarized during the [Soviet Afghan] war, but were linked at the time to the centrist conservative parties of the Afghan resistance, Nabi Muhammadi's Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement) and the Hizb-i-Islami of Yunis Khalis. During the war the links with Pakistani *madrasas* were strengthened. Afghan Taliban studied in Pakistan, Afghan refugees enrolled in Pakistani *madrasas*, and Pakistani volunteers joined the Afghans."

¹¹⁷ Kux, 305.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 304.

By the end of 1990, the weakened political status of Benazir Bhutto finally gave way altogether. President Ghulam Ishaq invoked the Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution and dismissed Benazir Bhutto for nepotism and corruption. As the political stability in Pakistan deteriorated, the United States suspended the \$564 million in economic and military aid to Pakistan. Reminiscent of the Carter administration's actions, these sanctions fueled Pakistan's narrative that the United States was a fair weather friend.¹¹⁹ Using the Pressler Amendment as justification, the Bush administration allowed the Agency for International Development (AID) to continue to distribute the almost one billion dollars already allocated for economic development.¹²⁰ As the interest of the United States in South Asia waned, so did its financial support.

After Benazir Bhutto's dismissal, Nawaz Sharif emerged as Pakistan's new Prime Minister. His goal of boosting Pakistan's economy was challenged as the United States sanctions were taking their toll on Pakistan. Pakistani public opinion towards the United States was categorized as "disbelief, shock and anger," as it questioned why the United States did not impose the same sanctions on India for detonating a nuclear device in 1974.¹²¹ Although the sanctions

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 308. "At the time, Pakistan was the third-highest recipient of U.S. aid; only Israel and Egypt received more assistance." Ibid., 308.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 309; Federation of American Scientists, "The Pressler Amendment And Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program (Senate-July 31, 1992)," <http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1992/920731.htm> (viewed August 2, 2010). The Pressler Amendment Kux refers to is defined as "On March 28, 1984, this Committee adopted an amendment offered by Sen. Cranston and myself providing that no assistance shall be furnished and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan unless the President could first certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device, is not developing a nuclear device, and is not acquiring goods to make such a device. On April 3, 1984, the Committee narrowly voted to reconsider this amendment and adopted instead a substitute offered by Senator Pressler, Mathias and Percy, which tied the continuation of aid and military sales to two certification conditions: (1) that Pakistan not possess a nuclear explosive device; and (2) that new aid will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess such a device. This text, which was enacted on another bill in August 1985, has come to be called the Pressler amendment.

¹²¹ Ibid., 311.

were justified, many in the Bush administration and the Department of Defense remained disconcerted about the damaged relationship between the United States and Pakistan.¹²²

In September 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to stop supplying military equipment to Afghanistan. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the five Central Asian Soviet republics, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, resulted in the collapse of the Soviet sponsored Najibullah regime. In April 1992, as the *mujahedeen* marched into Kabul and established a new Afghan government, Pakistan brokered the solution to the new Afghanistan government by placing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as Prime Minister, Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani as President, and Ahmed Shah Masood, as the Defense Minister.¹²³ Antonio Giustozzi writes about the results of the new government in Afghanistan in his book *Empires of Mud*, stating, “The power-sharing formula devised in Peshawar in April failed to hold mainly because it proved difficult to establish a balance of power among the different factions.”¹²⁴ This division between factions fueled a civil war that opened the door for the Taliban to seize control of Afghanistan and begin Al Qaeda’s rise to global recognition.

When President Clinton entered into the Oval Office, his stance on Pakistan was not much different than that of his predecessor. What continued to disturb Washington was “the realization that Pakistan was harboring hundreds of young Islamic extremists, graduates of guerrilla training camps set up during the Afghan war and located near Peshawar or just over the

¹²² Ibid., 313.

¹²³ Ibid., 318.

¹²⁴ Antonio Giustozzi, *Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 69. Giustozzi highlights the transition of the post-Najibullah regime, “The first president of post-Najibullah Afghanistan was Sebghatullah Mojaddidi, the elderly leader of Jabh-I Nejat-I Milli, who served for two months before handing over the post to Professor Rabbani, the leader of Jami’at who was supposed to stay in the post for four months before handing over to a successor to be designated. Rabbani’s later refusal to leave the post was one of the factors contributing to the slide towards civil war, which had already started for other reasons.”

border in Afghanistan.”¹²⁵ The Islamic militants who were responsible for the fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan were, as Edward Gargan cites, “radical Arabs who were once welcome here [Peshawar, Pakistan] because they fought alongside Afghans, but who now want to use Pakistani or Afghan territory to spread *jihad*, or holy war, to their own homelands.”¹²⁶ The groups residing in Pakistan since the Soviet-Afghan war were now beginning to export their transnational *jihad* beyond South Asia.

In response to the United States concerns over Pakistan becoming a nation that harbored terrorists, Nawaz Sharif sent the Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry, Akram Zaki to the United States to assure the Clinton Administration that Pakistan would take action to stop terrorist activity within its borders. Pakistan began to address the issue in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, causing most of these groups to simply cross the border into Afghanistan. Nawaz also replaced the ISI director, Lieutenant General Javed Nasir, considered to be “a maverick identified with religious extremists.”¹²⁷ By January 1993, Prime Minister Sharif would be implicated in the death of General Asif Nawaz. This, combined with the impression recorded by historians that the ISI had gained the upper hand over the military in political influence, caused infighting between President Ishaq Khan and Sharif. Because of this political infighting, President Ishaq Khan dismissed Nawaz Sharif, and a caretaker government was installed until elections could be held.¹²⁸ With economic assistance from the United States dwindling and the Islamic extremist issue growing, the Pakistani government began the recovery process again.

¹²⁵ Kux, 322.

¹²⁶ Edward A. Gargan, “Radical Arabs Use Pakistan as Base for Holy War,” The New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/08/world/radical-arabs-use-pakistan-as-base-for-holy-war.html?sec=&spon> (viewed August 5, 2010).

¹²⁷ Kux, 322. Kux cited that Lt. Gen Nasir also was a strong backer of ISI involvement in Kashmir. He elaborates to the ISI actions with the Islamic extremists, “Direct ISI support for the insurgents tapered off, but retired military intelligence personnel and Afghan mujahedeen working through the Jamaat-i-Islami and other extremist groups with close ties with the ISI provided “privatized” help to the Kashmiri dissidents. Even though the change was to some extent cosmetic, it proved sufficient for the State Department not to take the extreme step of pinning the ‘terrorist state’ label on Pakistan.”

¹²⁸ Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, 227.

As Pakistan began to recover from another failed political regime, the issue of the production, distribution, and use of drugs within Pakistan's borders re-emerged.¹²⁹ As a direct result of the refugees migrating from Afghanistan to Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War, Pakistan was by then providing an estimated one-fifth of the entire heroin consumed in the United States. According to United Nations figures, domestic addition within Pakistan's borders reached 1.7 million users, almost 1.5 percent of Pakistan's population. To assist in stemming the tide of this epidemic, the United States approved two million dollars in anti-drug assistance. However the potential for bribes, and a less than aggressive counter-drug program due to financial constraints, produced little effort to stem the tide of addiction in Pakistan.¹³⁰

President Kahn's solution to filling the political void was installing a caretaker government headed by one of its Foreign Service diplomats named Moen Qureshi. His objective of restoring the government and preparing for new elections led to drastic cuts in government expenses and enforcement of unpaid taxes. Qureshi froze Pakistan's nuclear program and, by doing so, enhanced relations with the United States. Yet all of these drastic measures produced little in his short tenure. It did however lead to the devaluation of the rupee and the lower class's inability to acquire the basic necessities and the dismissal of Qureshi.¹³¹ The resulting elections in 1993 saw the re-emergence of the socialist PPP, with Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister and the PPP supporter Farooq Leghari as President.¹³²

¹²⁹ Ibid. Ziring expands on the state of political affairs in Pakistan in 1993, "All of Pakistan's institutions and all of its previous leaders had failed in their service to the nation. Moreover, neither the Army nor the bureaucracy was ready to fill the political vacuum. But returning the country to the 'normalcy' of conventional politics after the long years of martial law and military rule proved difficult."

¹³⁰ Kux, 324.

¹³¹ Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*, 227.

¹³² Ibid., 233.

The possibility that a Pakistani Prime Minister might complete a full term in office—the first time since 1985—looked promising.¹³³ With a second chance to serve as Prime Minister and a fellow PPP supporter as President of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto re-implemented the democratization program she started during her first term. The possibility of having a consistent and experienced government lifting Pakistan out of economic and political failure was dashed as Bhutto clashed with the judiciary. Failing to adequately address the mounting economic crisis, and increasing instability within the PPP, generated the conditions in which the relationship between Bhutto and President Leghari began to deteriorate.¹³⁴

Benazir Bhutto's re-election and political decisions led to an increase in militancy and sectarianism on the part of Islamic fundamentalists. Support for the Taliban spread outside the tribal areas with the defeat of the religious parties in the 1993 elections. Mullahs chanted, "After Kabul, Islamabad...Taliban, Taliban," outside the Lahore High Court during a hearing of the petition against death sentence of Christian worshipers, Salamat and Rehmat Masih for violating the Blasphemy Law.¹³⁵ South Asia specialist Dennis Kux fuses these events with the Zia regime by stating, "The seeds that Zia has planted in the late 1970s had taken root."¹³⁶ This event, and the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, stemming from the re-election of Benazir Bhutto, emphasized the strength of the growing Islamic militancy in Pakistan.¹³⁷

¹³³ Talbot, 334.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 340.

¹³⁶ Kux, 338. Kux elaborates on Bhutto's inability to cope with the rise of Islamic fundamentalists when he states, "Another serious problem facing Bhutto was the government's seemingly inability to cope with the rise of Islamic extremist groups and the breakdown of law and order in many parts of the country." He further writes that, "Participation in the 'freedom struggle' in Afghanistan and Kashmir, as well as unofficial links with the ISI, lent added legitimacy to the Islamic radical groups, as did the presence in the Pakistani government of the *Jamiat-i-Ulema Islam*, one faction of which was the intellectual forebear of the Taliban."

¹³⁷ Talbot, 341.

It was during Benazir Bhutto's regime that the Taliban gained prominence in South Asia. The Taliban were a product of the madrassas in Pakistan set up during the Zia regime under the Islamization program. The fundamentalist Deobandi sect of Sunni Islam and its conservative political party offshoot, the Jamait-i-Ulema Islam, controlled most of the madrassas that were created during the Zia years.¹³⁸ Kux, reinforces this notion by stating, "In a sense, the Taliban were the most prominent product of Zia's policy of promoting Islamic schools."¹³⁹ Scholar and former political advisor to Pakistan, Hussain Haqqani cites the origins of the Taliban, by stating, "Most accounts of the Taliban's emergence acknowledge that they were a local phenomenon reflecting frustration with the *mujahedeen* leaders and warlords, which were later backed by the ISI."¹⁴⁰ The Taliban became instrumental in easing the threat from their western border and facilitating the opening of a trade route through Afghanistan to the central Asian republics.¹⁴¹

The fighting in Afghanistan, and the rivalry between President Burhanuddin Rabbini, Defense Minister Ahmed Masood and Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, produced a stalemate in the continuing civil war in Afghanistan. This stalemate impeded the Pakistani government's goal of a Pashtun led government in Afghanistan. Pakistan became concerned that Hekmatyar's *mujahedeen* forces could not seize Kabul and take control of the Afghan government. This caused the Pakistanis to look for a group that could achieve their aims in Afghanistan.¹⁴² Haqqani elaborates on the *mujahedeen*'s role in Afghanistan during the civil war and the causal reasoning for the shift in support to the Taliban from the *mujahedeen*,

¹³⁸ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 17-30.

¹³⁹ Kux, 338. Kux further elaborates, "In the two decades since Zia initiated the pro-madrassa policy in the late 1970s the religious schools had spread widely, in a process spawning a vast subculture of youth lettered in the Koran but little else and inculcated with religious fanaticism: in essence, they produced cannon fodder for the Taliban's military campaigns."

¹⁴⁰ Haqqani, 239.

¹⁴¹ Kux, 335.

¹⁴² Haqqani, 238.

The once respected *mujahedeen* had now become dreaded soldiers in the armies of the warlords who looted and raped unarmed Afghans. In such circumstances, a group [of] religious students challenged the warlords in the southeastern province of Kandahar.¹⁴³ By the summer of 1994, Pakistan began to support Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar by supplying his forces with military instruction and equipment through the ISI.

The once celebrated *mujahedeen*'s time had come to an end, making way for a new more religious minded organization, the Taliban.

From their base in Kandahar, the Taliban began taking over Afghanistan. According to regional expert Ahmed Rashid, the aim of the Taliban in Afghanistan was to “restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghanistan.”¹⁴⁴ Supported by the ISI, the Taliban systematically controlled every major city in Afghanistan by September 1996. Within a year after the fall of Kabul, Mullah Omar imposed strict Islamic law and declared Afghanistan an Islamic Emirate.¹⁴⁵ With Pakistan's assistance, the Taliban accomplished in two years what Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's *mujahedeen* failed to do in over a decade. Many authors attribute this to a fractionalization of the *mujahedeen* after the Soviet-Afghan War, while others like Kux credit the Pashtun *mujahedeen* for defecting to the Taliban due to tribal affiliation.¹⁴⁶ Regardless of whether the *mujahedeen* or Taliban controlled Kabul, it was clearly overshadowed by the fact that the Pakistani government, via the ISI, supported both organizations in their attempts.

Despite the ongoing nuclear issue, Benazir Bhutto did increase relations with the United States. Pakistan became an important part of the United Nation's (UN) efforts in Somalia and in

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Rashid, 22.

¹⁴⁵ Kux, 336.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 335. Kux states, “After taking Jalalabad on September 11 1996, the Taliban forces advanced swiftly towards Kabul. As the Taliban swept forward, they brushed aside fellow Pashtun Hekmatyar, the ISI's longtime favorite. Casualties were minimal, as many of Hekmatyar's fighters defected to the Taliban.”

Bosnia.¹⁴⁷ In 1995, Pakistan assisted the U.S. in the capture and extradition of Ramsi Yousef, the planner of the 1993 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City.¹⁴⁸ In turn, Bhutto requested the release of the sixty F-16 fighter aircraft that Pakistan purchased from the United States which were being held in the United States as part of the sanctions from the Pressler Amendment. The Clinton Administration refused to release the jets, leading to the Brown Amendment—an amendment designed to ease the sanctions of the Pressler Amendment.¹⁴⁹ The Brown Amendment ultimately assured Pakistan that it would receive \$368 million of Pakistani-owned military equipment and a refund on \$120 million for items paid for, but not produced, before the 1990 Pressler Amendment sanctions took effect.¹⁵⁰

Benazir Bhutto's second attempt governing Pakistan ended as a result of a deteriorated relationship with President Leghari, corruption leading to the financial ruin of the Pakistani economy, and her suspected links to the murder of her brother Murtaza Bhutto.¹⁵¹ Benazir Bhutto did attempt to reform the power generation issues in Pakistan. In an attempt to offset the economic sanctions imposed by the United States, Bhutto sought to collect close to \$4 billion from outside investors.¹⁵² In the end, it was Benazir Bhutto's inability to deal with the rise of the militant extremism within Pakistan's borders that led to her ouster.¹⁵³ Finally on November 5,

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 328. Pakistan contributed to the U.N. efforts in Somalia by sending six thousand troops and also assisted U.N. efforts in Bosnia by sending three thousand troops.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 329.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 331. Kux cites, "The Brown Amendment removed the bar to economic assistance, the Clinton administration chose not to re-established a bilateral aid program and gave only modest grants to Pakistani nongovernmental organization, amounting to \$2 million dollars a year."

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 338.

¹⁵¹ Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*, 555. Ziring addresses the public spectacle of Bhutto family feud by stating, "Benazir could not prevent a gross public display of family feuding, nor could the print media ignore the drama of the confrontation, or what the sustained controversy did to the mystique and the country's image abroad. If it were not so serious a matter it would be laughable, but few people in Pakistan saw the humor in the family contest of wills."

¹⁵² Kux, 338.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

1996, President Leghari dissolved the National Assembly and removed Benazir Bhutto by a parliamentary majority, replacing her with Malik Meraj Khalid stepping in as temporary prime minister.

In a landslide election in February 1997, Nawaz Sharif returned to the Prime Minister's office. Not wanting to succumb to same fate as Benazir Bhutto, Sharif Nawwaz's Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML[N]) led regime tried securing his position in the Pakistani government by amending the Constitution. While securing his role in the government, his actions segregated the Islamist representation and created political tension among those who supported the Taliban led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The re-emergence of the longstanding conflict in the Jammu-Kashmir region and the comfort of a Pakistan friendly regime in Afghanistan diverted the Pakistani government's attention from influencing the Taliban to addressing Al Qaeda's transnational *jihad* program. By doing so, it allowed Osama bin Laden and his formation of the "World Islamic Front for *jihad* against the Jews and the Crusaders" (World Islamic Front) to take action against the United States and its allies. Despite his efforts to secure his position and improve relations with the United States and India, Nawaz's reign would end in yet another Pakistani military coup.¹⁵⁴

To protect himself from being relieved by President Leghari, Sharif's first act was to create the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 1973. The Thirteenth Amendment repealed Zia ul Haq's Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The Eighth Amendment stated the president retained sole control over Pakistan's government and maintained the ability to dissolve the government at his will. This made the prime minister post the most powerful political position in Pakistan, and basically reduced the position of the presidency to a ceremonial figurehead.¹⁵⁵ Later that year, Nawaz further strengthened his position in the legislature by passing the

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Talbot, 360.

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution through a PML(N) majority National Assembly. The Fourteenth Amendment stipulated that legislature could not defect from their parties, a preemptive measure by Nawaz to ensure the PML(N) maintained its majority in the National Assembly.¹⁵⁶

Nawaz Sharif's efforts for sole control of Pakistan did not go unnoticed. Reminiscent of the Zia regime, his policies were aimed at curbing the authority of the president, army commander, parliament, and judiciary.¹⁵⁷ After the media warned the Pakistani people of an impending coup, Sharif retreated from his efforts as the Islamist organizations, who had very little representation in the elected assemblies, threatened to overthrow the Parliament and replace Pakistan's government with one resembling the Taliban's Islamic emirate.¹⁵⁸

Sharif further upset the Islamist organizations in Pakistan by making statements about easing tensions with India to pursue economic trade relations. Hussain Haqqani states that the ISI with the Islamists were "running large-scale *jihad* operations in Afghanistan and Kashmir that could be jeopardized by Sharif's ideas of trade with India."¹⁵⁹ Before Sharif implemented his plan, India conducted testing on their nuclear program. Despite warnings of economic sanctions by the United States, Pakistan responded by exploding five nuclear devices underground in Baluchistan and declared themselves a nuclear power with the delivery capacity to retaliate against India.¹⁶⁰ With Pakistan focusing on preserving the sovereignty of its nation and a potential nuclear crisis with India, Pakistani leaders resisted assisting the United States in the apprehension of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan. Pakistan claimed that Afghan customs regarding hospitality would render their efforts useless, leading the United States to

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 361.

¹⁵⁷ Haqqani, 244.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 245.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 247.

launch cruise missiles into Afghanistan in August of 1998.¹⁶¹ This event confirms that the actions by the Pakistani government to preserve the sovereignty of the Muslim state overshadowed its assistance of the United States in their efforts to apprehend Osama bin Laden and defeat Al Qaeda.

Osama bin Laden's formation of the World Islamic Front consisted of Ayman al-Zawahiri of Egypt's *jihad* Group, Rifia Taha of Egypt's Islamic Group, and leaders of Pakistani and Bangladeshi militant organizations.¹⁶² Their message of participating in a transnational *jihad* against the United States was captured in their manifesto delivered at the inauguration of the World Islamic Front:

...Based upon this and in order to obey the Almighty, we hereby give all Muslims the following judgment: The judgment to kill and fight Americans and their allies, whether civilians or military, is an obligation for every Muslim who is able to do so in any country...In the name of Allah, we call upon every Muslim, who believes in Allah and asks for forgiveness, to abide by Allah's order by killing Americans and stealing their money anywhere, anytime and whenever possible. We also call upon Muslim scholars, their faithful leaders, young believers, and soldiers to launch a raid on the American soldiers of Satan and their allies of the Devil.¹⁶³

This manifesto builds on the 1979 narrative Friedman cited. The Arab and Egyptian Islamic fundamentalist who travelled to Pakistan to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan evolved into a network of transnational *jihadists* whose goal was to repel and prevent the West from exploiting the Muslims.

The military was growing concerned with the amount of authority Sharif created through the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.¹⁶⁴ With Sharif's growing disputes with President Leghari and the judiciary, the military attempted to resolve the situation. Despite the military's efforts, President Leghari stepped down and Rafiq Tarar was elected. The military also found

¹⁶¹ Kux, 349.

¹⁶² Peter Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Touchstone Books, 2002), 98.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Talbot, 363.

themselves handling what some considered routine administrative tasks that the civil authorities were unable to perform, from monitoring the census to confirming the actual existence of schools and health care centers that were receiving government aid.¹⁶⁵ Although these events demonstrate the flexibility of the Pakistani military, they more importantly highlighted the inability of the other Pakistani agencies designed to perform these tasks.

Tensions between the military and the government grew over economic crisis and the latest Jammu-Kashmir issue with India. This relationship between Sharif and CoAS General Pervez Musharraf was tested when Pakistani-supported insurgents occupied the 15,000-foot positions over the Jammu-Kashmir region in Kargil. Sharif's critics blamed him for approving a poorly planned operation and blamed the military for creating such a plan.¹⁶⁶ This event was a major setback to Sharif's intentions of closer relations with India. Sharif's political efforts to peacefully defuse the Kargil insurgency created tensions between the military and the Pakistani central government, leading to the resignation of General Jehangir Karamat who was Pakistan's top military official. The tensions between the military and the Prime Minister eased when Sharif appointed General Pervez Musharraf to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1998.¹⁶⁷

Within a year of Musharraf's appointment, the Sharif regime attempted to relieve General Musharraf in order to avert an impending military coup. Unsuccessful in his attempt, the military once again seized control of the Pakistani government in October 1999. General Musharraf assumed the role of Chief Executive, a title that carried the same responsibilities CMLA but sounded more political. Pakistan entered into another era of military rule facing regional issues,

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 365.

¹⁶⁶ Kux, 353.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

growing national instability and a relationship with the United States that, within a little over a year, placed Pakistan at the epicenter of the Global War on Terror.

Thirteen years after Mohammad Zia ul Haq died, the Pakistani government continued to struggle to reestablish themselves economically. With Benazir Bhutto, and the PPP and Sharif Nawaz's PML(N) administrations both being characterized as corrupt and scandalous, the government made little progress in reducing the growing threat of the Islamists organizations who were beginning their transnational *jiḥād* outside of South Asia. Despite the United States' sanctions through the Pressler Amendment, Pakistan enhanced its nuclear program to counter the threat from India while the insurgent organizations along Pakistan's western border continued to support the fighting in Afghanistan. The ISI supported and funded these groups in an effort to overthrow the government in Kabul and establish a Pakistan-friendly regime. It is from this relationship with the Taliban, and the Pakistani government's reluctance to assist the United States in apprehending Osama bin Laden, that the events on September 11, 2001 emerged. While the Zia ul Haq regimes Islamization program laid the foundation for the formation of these Islamic militant groups, it was during the 1990s that the ISI supported Taliban provided the resources and the areas for Al Qaeda and their transnational jihadists to flourish.

Conclusion

After 63 years as a nation, Pakistan still remains a sovereign Muslim state. The government's interpretation of what defines a sovereign Muslim state has changed over the years, as evidenced through the reconstruction of the Constitution three times and addition of eighteen Amendments. The government's approach toward leading the Pakistanis through their early history fluctuated, with each regime wresting the power from the people and placing it under the government's control. Whether it was the ever-present threat from India, or an internal threat of Islamic fundamentalism, the military continued to preserve the sovereignty of Pakistan. Once the

military viewed the government's actions as threatening to the sovereignty of Pakistan, it intervened with a coup and presided over the country while a new government was established.

What resulted from these coups was Zia ul Haq's interpretation of a sovereign Muslim state, which according to him, needed to be a military dictatorship under his rule. It is from Zia's Islamization program that the militant Islamic groups found their roots in the tribal areas in western Pakistan. These groups grew to form the *mujahedeen*, who received the bulk of their equipment and resources from ISI and the Pakistani government. The people who would comprise the formations of these insurgent groups were recruited largely from the Pashtun residents within the tribal belt, refugees from Afghanistan, and *jihadists* from the Middle East. Zia's Islamization program provided the funding for these Muslim extremists to fight the Soviets and fostered a desire for Muslims to conduct a *jihad* against the Western occupation of Muslim territory. In an effort to create a buffer from the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Pakistani government provided a safe haven for these groups to exist free of western interference.

Throughout the Soviet-Afghan War, the tribal regions within Pakistan were used as a place for the *mujahedeen* to recruit, reorganize, and reequip their forces. The buffer between Pakistan and Afghanistan created by Pakistan's frontier allowed Zia to focus his conventional military forces towards the border with India. Subsequently, the tribal areas that comprised this buffer provided an excellent area for these militant groups to operate without implicating Zia's government in their activities. After the war, these areas continued to harbor, train, and assist the *mujahedeen* in their efforts to overthrow the Afghan government.

Zia's Islamization program focused on Sunni based religious reform of Pakistan. This led to an increase in the number of madrassas within the frontier region. These madrassas recruited and trained Pakistanis, refugees from the Soviet-Afghan War, and foreign Muslim fighters from across the Middle East. It is these foreign fighters who assisted the *mujahedeen* in fighting the Soviets who harbored a transnational jihadist mentality rather than focusing on the Soviet's threat

to Pakistan's sovereignty. These foreign fighters continued to fight in Afghanistan after the Soviet-Afghan War and formed what became Al Qaeda.

Financing, primarily from the United States and Saudi Arabia, through Zia's government during this period equipped these groups to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. In order to assist Pakistan in equipping the *mujahedeen* to fight the Soviets, the United States and Saudi Arabia provided an estimated \$40 billion dollars during the Soviet-Afghan War. Distribution of the funding was left to the ISI. Because of this, the United States did not have a clear understanding of where the funds were going and to whom. It was clear that, by the end of the Soviet-Afghan War, the ISI did not support all the *mujahedeen* factions operating in Afghanistan equally. In fact the majority of the funds went to Pashtun tribes. These Pashtun *mujahedeen* were the groups that Pakistan wanted to seize control of Afghanistan after the Soviets left in order to install a Pakistan friendly Pashtun government in Afghanistan.

Pakistan began to recover from Zia's eleven-year regime after his death in 1988. The 1990s in Pakistan were characterized by political turmoil as Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and the PPP competed for control of Pakistan with Nawaz Sharif's, Muslim League. Benazir Bhutto and Sharif were each elected to the position of Prime Minister twice, each time they were asked to step down over charges of corruption and because of their disagreements with the Pakistani government and its institutions. The political turmoil within Pakistan, the continued conflict with India, and the economic sanctions by the United States took precedence over the Pakistani government's efforts to control the spread of militant Islam in Pakistan.

In an effort to maintain the military balance with India, Pakistan continued to develop its nuclear program. Despite warnings from the United States, Pakistan did not freeze its nuclear development efforts, which caused the United States to impose economic sanctions. These sanctions further hindered the government's efforts to rebuild Pakistan's economy. By the end of

the 1990s, the nuclear issue came to a head over the disputed border with India, with both sides detonating nuclear devices underground.

The 1990s also saw the emergence of the Taliban, their subsequent control of Afghanistan, and the rise of Al Qaeda. By 1993, the Mullah Omar's Taliban, formed from students with ties to the madrassas within Pakistan's tribal areas, began to occupy Kandahar to impose strict Islamic law in Afghanistan. With Pakistan wanting to open trade routes to the Central Asian States and establish a Pakistan-friendly government in Kabul, the ISI began to support the Taliban. By 1996, the Taliban were in control of the central government in Kabul. It is also at this time that Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan and established the World Islamic Front for *jihad*, while recruiting and training Islamic militants in Afghanistan for Al Qaeda. It is from these training bases in Afghanistan the plans for the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 would be carried out.

From there, it was only a matter of time before the puppy raised at home would begin to bite its own people.

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